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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Perry Wayne Gadue appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In October 2008, the state charged Gadue with aggravated battery. (See R., 
pp.4, 114-115.) A jury found Gadue guilty of the charged offense and the district 
court imposed a unified 15-year sentence with five years fixed. (See R., pp.4, 117-
118.) Gadue filed an unsuccessful appeal in which he only challenged his sentence. 
State v. Gadue, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 487 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Gadue filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.4-95.) 
The court appointed counsel and the state filed an Answer, a Statement of Facts, 
and a Motion for Summary Dismissal with a supporting memorandum. (R., pp.99, 
110-141.) The state also filed a motion asking the court to take judicial notice of a 
number of pleadings and transcripts from Cadue's underlying criminal case. (R., 
pp.142-236.) Gadue, with the assistance of counsel, filed a written response to the 
state's motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.250-265.) 
The court granted the state's motion for judicial notice and conducted a 
hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal after which it entered an order 
granting the state's request for summary dismissal. (See generally Tr.; R., pp.267-
273.) The court entered Judgment dismissing Cadue's petition and Gadue filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.274-276, 278-281, 290.) The court appointed the 
State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") to represent Gadue on appeal (R., 
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pp.282-284); however, the case was reassigned by the SAPD to a different attorney 
who was later allowed to withdraw after Gadue requested that he be allowed to 
proceed pro se (Letter notifying Court of change of assigned attorney, dated 
December 21, 2012; Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and Allow 
Appellant to Proceed Pro Se, dated June 19, 2013). 
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ISSUES 
Gadue states the issues on appeal as (verbatim): 
1). WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT IN GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION, IMPROPERLY DECIDED DISPUTED 
FACTUAL ISSUES. 
2). WHETHER CADUE'S FACTUALLY ALLEGATIONS OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL, DUE PROCESS, 
RAISED A MATERIAL ISSUE UNDER THE SIXTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
3). WHETHER CONFLICT COUNSEL THAT WAS APPOINTED TO 
REPRESENT CADUE'S POST CONVICTION PETITION WAS 
INEFFECTIVE TO PROCEED WITH ONLY (30) DAYS TO 
VIGOROUS [sic] ADVOCATE, DEFEND, LITIGATE, BY 
ESTABLISHING THE FACTS ANED EVENTS OF HIS INDIVIDUAL 
CLAIM[S]. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3 (capitalization original).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
1. Has Gadue failed to establish the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his untimely petition for post-conviction relief? 
2. Should this Court decline to consider Cadue's claim, raised for the first 
time on appeal, that post-conviction counsel was ineffective? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Gadue Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Gadue contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-
conviction petition. Review of the record and the applicable legal standards shows 
otherwise. Because Gadue failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact in 
support of any claim alleged in his petition, he was not entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing and summary dismissal was appropriate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate 
court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested 
relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); 
Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 
1986). 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Cadue's Petition Without An 
Evidentiary Hearing 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. 
"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
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establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 
278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). 
Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" 
as to each element of petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 
164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 
90 P .3d at 297. When a post-conviction petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of 
counsel, in order to survive summary dismissal of his petition, he must specifically 
allege that "(1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance 
was deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency 
prejudiced the applicant's case." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 
362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted). "To establish deficient assistance, 
the burden is on the petitioner to show that his attorney's conduct fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. This objective standard embraces a strong 
presumption that trial counsel was competent and diligent." !si "[S]trategic or 
tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are 
based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation." !si "To establish prejudice, the claimant must 
show a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." !si 
While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the 
court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
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unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 
799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the 
petitioner to relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
prior to dismissing the petition. & (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for 
the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." & A review of the record 
shows Gadue failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an 
evidentiary hearing. 
Gadue asserts summary dismissal was improper because, he contends, there 
"is a question of fact as to whether [he) was in fact in fear of great bodily harm or 
death due to the knife at the time of the incident," and the "trier of fact must weigh 
the testimony and evidence regarding this upon the record of these proceedings."1 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) Gadue then seems to tie this "factual dispute" into his 
allegations that trial counsel was ineffective for not "let[ting]" him testify and not 
"fil[ing) a motion to compel the production of the razor knife," which the state "never 
produced." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) Gadue then concludes: "Accordingly, there 
is clearly a material question of fact as to whether trial counsel's performance 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which must be taken up at an 
1 Gadue's arguments on why he believes summary dismissal was improper are 
contained in his second argument section; his first argument section only recites 
legal standards. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-11.) The state will, therefore, treat Gadue's 
first and second sections as one. 
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evidentiary hearing in this matter" and "summary disposition was inappropriate." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
Cadue's assertion that counsel was ineffective for not "let[ting] him testify" 
was not alleged in his petition. (R., pp.4-22.) Instead, Gadue did not make such an 
assertion until he filed his response to the state's motion for summary dismissal. 
"Idaho Code section 19-4903 mandates that the application for post-conviction relief 
'specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based . . .. All 
grounds for relief ... must be raised in [the defendant's] original, supplemental, or 
amended application.' I.C. § 19-4908." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 
P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (emphasis added, alteration original). The state objected to 
Cadue's efforts to assert a claim for the first time in his responsive memorandum for 
this reason - noting no such claim was properly before the court because Gadue 
did not raise it in his petition. (Tr., p.6, L.23- p.7, L.7, p.8, Ls.16-20, p.24, Ls.13-21, 
p.30, L.23 - p.31, L. 7.) Post-conviction counsel conceded as much, but argued the 
claim was "essentially inherent in the pleadings." (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-11, p.17, L.8 -
p.18, L.10, p.20, Ls.4-19.) 
The district court rejected Cadue's attempt to raise a new claim for the first 
time in his memorandum filed in response to the state's motion for summary 
dismissal. The court noted the claim was not alleged in Cadue's petition, he did not 
seek leave to file an amended petition, nor did his affidavit allege "how he received 
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ineffective assistance of counsel regarding testifying at trial."2 (R., p.271; also p.272 
("Allegations in petitioner's counsel's memorandum do not serve as evidence.").) 
Because Gadue was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim he did not 
properly allege, he has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his "claim" 
that counsel was ineffective for not "let[ting]" him testify. 
Gadue also argues there "is a genuine issue of material fact that is disputed, 
and calls for a [sic] evidentiary hearing to resolve it" in relation to the victim's 
testimony that he had a knife in his pocket that the hospital returned to him but the 
knife is not listed on the "emergency department belongings list" and Brenda Gully 
testified shE? removed the knife on scene and gave it to an officer. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.10.) The closest claim alleged in the petition to this argument is that counsel failed 
to "acquire 'Brenda Gully' [sic] Report of 'Treatment,' showing the knife was 
collected and given to [sic] custody of Officer Frick." (R., p.17 (quotations and 
capitalization original, emphasis omitted).) Assuming the claim Gadue is raising on 
appeal is the same claim raised in his petition, he failed to allege a genuine issue of 
material fact warranting an evidentiary hearing. 
Brenda Gully, a paramedic who responded to the scene of the battery, 
testified that she removed the knife from the victim "and gave it to the officer on 
scene" but did not know what happened to the knife after that. (R., p.209.) It is also 
2 The closet allegation in Gadue's supporting affidavit is that his "side of the story 
needed to be shown to the jury but was not." (R., p.34.) In addition to the fact that 
there was no claim in the petition, this allegation is insufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel as it fails to provide any factual basis 
for a claim that counsel prevented Gadue from testifying. Indeed, when read in 
context, Gadue's allegation that "his side of the story needed to be shown to the jury" 
could be referring to the deficiencies actually alleged in the petition. 
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apparent from the transcript of her testimony that defense counsel had Gully's 
"patient care report," which was marked as Defendant's Exhibit D. (R., p.209.) 
Thus, any claim that counsel failed to acquire the report is disproved by the record. 
As for Cadue's assertions relating to the victim's testimony regarding the 
disposition of the knife, the victim admitted at trial that he had "razor knife" in his 
front pocket at the time of the altercation and when asked what happened to it, he 
said: "I think I got it back from the safe out of the hospital when I got -- I was 
discharged out of the hospital." (R., pp.184-185.) Although Cadue claims this was a 
"lie[]" based on the "emergency department belongings list" (Appellant's Brief, p.10), 
he offered no evidence of such. Nor was the victim necessarily lying about 
retrieving the knife from the hospital just because Brenda Gully said she gave the 
knife to the officer on scene. Since the officer obviously did not collect the knife as 
evidence, it could have very well been left with the victim's other possessions at the 
hospital, which he retrieved upon discharge. In any event, Cadue failed to allege 
how he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to exploit any alleged lie by the victim as 
to whether he retrieved the knife from the hospital or not. Having failed to allege a 
prima facie case of deficient performance or prejudice on this claim, summary 
dismissal was appropriate. 
Finally, Cadue claims there is a genuine issue of material fact on whether 
Officer Frick ever authored an undisclosed police report. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) 
Cadue was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim because he failed to 
produce any actual evidence that such a report exists. Rather, he speculates that 
Officer Frick wrote a report at one time that contained a reference to the victim's 
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knife but later amended his report to omit that reference. 3 (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-
11.) Conclusory, speculative allegations unsupported by evidence are insufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact. Workman, supra. Cadue failed to allege a 
prima facie case that counsel was deficient for failing to obtain a report, which there 
is no evidence exists, or that he was prejudiced as a result given that the victim 
admitted at trial that he had a razor knife in his pocket. (See R., pp.115-116.) 
Summary dismissal was therefore appropriate. 
Cadue has failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
petition. 
11. 
Cadue's Claim That Post-Conviction Counsel Was Ineffective Is Not Properly Before 
This Court 
In hi.s second claim, Cadue appears to contend post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) This claim is not properly before the Court 
for consideration. 
It is well-established that this Court, as a general rule, does not consider 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 375-376, 859 P.2d 972, 973-974 (Ct. App. 1993) ("it is 
generally inappropriate to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct 
appeal from the judgment of conviction"). If Cadue wishes to challenge the 
performance of post-conviction counsel, the proper course of action is to file a 
successive petition. Idaho Code § 19-4908 permits a petitioner to file a successive 
3 The ;tate denied there were two reports authored by Officer Frick. (R., p.132; Tr., 
p.15, Ls.1-7.) 
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petition if the petitioner can establish "sufficient reason" to do so. Ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel in relation to an initial petition can constitute a 
sufficient reason for pursuing a successive petition. Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 
186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted) ("Ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may, however, provide sufficient reason 
for permitting newly-asserted allegations or allegations inadequately raised in the 
initial petition to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction petition."). It appears 
Gadue has taken advantage of this option as evidenced by his request to suspend 
this appeal prior to briefing in light of his successive petition filed in Twin Falls 
County Case No. CV-2013-1072.4 (Motion to Suspend Appeal and Statement in 
Support Thereof, filed April 2, 2013.) Cadue's claim that post-conviction counsel 
was ineffective is not preserved and should not be considered for the first time on 
appeal 
Because Gadue has failed to establish any basis for reversing the district 
court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition or any other basis for relief, the 
district court's order should be affirmed. 
4 The state objected to Cadue's motion to suspend the appeal pending adjudication 
of Cadue's successive petition and the Court denied Cadue's motion. (Objection to 
"Motion to Suspend the Appeal and Statement in Support Thereof," filed April 8, 
2013; Order Denying Motion to Suspend the Appeal, dated May 1, 2013.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Cadue's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of November 2013, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
PERRY W. GADUE 
IDOC # 94676 
ICC 
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Boise, ID 83707 
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